The power of informality : European Union’s engagement with non-state actors in Common Security and Defence Policy by Shapovalova, Natalia
  
 
 
 
warwick.ac.uk/lib-publications 
 
 
 
 
 
Original citation: 
Shapovalova, Natalia. (2016) The power of informality : European Union’s engagement with 
non-state actors in Common Security and Defence Policy. European Security, 25 (3). pp. 326-
345. 
 
Permanent WRAP URL: 
http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/81434                    
 
Copyright and reuse: 
The Warwick Research Archive Portal (WRAP) makes this work by researchers of the 
University of Warwick available open access under the following conditions.  Copyright © 
and all moral rights to the version of the paper presented here belong to the individual 
author(s) and/or other copyright owners.  To the extent reasonable and practicable the 
material made available in WRAP has been checked for eligibility before being made 
available. 
 
Copies of full items can be used for personal research or study, educational, or not-for  profit 
purposes without prior permission or charge.  Provided that the authors, title and full 
bibliographic details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the original metadata 
page and the content is not changed in any way. 
 
Publisher’s statement: 
“This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in European 
Securi on 14/06/2016 available online: 
http://www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/09662839.2016.1193487  
 
A note on versions: 
The version presented here may differ from the published version or, version of record, if 
you wish to cite this item you are advised to consult the publisher’s version.  Please see the 
‘permanent WRAP URL’ above for details on accessing the published version and note that 
access may require a subscription. 
 
For more information, please contact the WRAP Team at: wrap@warwick.ac.uk 
 
1 
The power of informality: EU’s engagement with non-state actors in CSDP 
Natalia Shapovalova 
Department of Politics and International Studies, University of Warwick, Coventry, UK 
University of Warwick,  Coventry CV4 7AL, phone: +447756741476, e-mail: 
natalka.shapovalova@gmail.com 
 
This article examines the little explored issue of non-state actor participation in the EU’s Common Security 
and Defence Policy (CSDP). Despite the fact that NGOs and civil society are shielded from formal access to 
CSDP, EU staff in both Brussels and the missions engage with them informally. Drawing on interviews with 
policymakers and non-state actor representatives, the article analyses the practices of the EU in its 
engagement with non-state actors, focusing on civilian missions in Georgia and Palestine. It shows that such 
engagement is more intense during implementation at the level of CSDP missions rather than during 
policymaking in Brussels. It argues that a combination of rational choice based (functional needs of 
policymakers and intensity of non-state actor advocacy) and constructivist (organisational and individual 
cultures) explanations helps us better understand why CSDP structures open up to non-state actors. The 
article contributes to the nascent academic and policy debate on EU-civil society cooperation in CSDP and, 
more broadly, to the studies of informal governance in the EU and non-state actor participation in 
international organisations. 
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Introduction 
The EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) is arguably one of the least accessible 
policy areas for the public and private interest groups that proliferate in other sectors of European 
integration. Regarded as the last bastion of state sovereignty, security and defence policy deals with 
‘high politics’ issues that are seen as too sensitive to be exposed to public scrutiny. A culture of 
secrecy and confidentiality prevails in the Council of the EU (Hayes-Renshaw 2009:73), the 
decision-making centre of CSDP, as well as in the crisis management departments of the European 
External Action Service (EEAS). The supranational institutions of the EU such as the Commission 
and the European Parliament, which open up access to interest groups, experts and civil society in 
other areas of European integration, are excluded from CSDP. Equivalents of consultation 
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mechanisms with non-state actors (NSA) in the policy process, which exist in the communitarised 
policy areas, are lacking in the EU security and defence policy.  
 
At the same time, cooperation with NSA, in particular civil society organisations (CSOs), is 
recognised by researchers and policymakers as a factor that influences the effectiveness and impact 
of EU interventions in foreign crises. Civil society may provide ‘valuable knowledge’ to the EU 
policymakers in CSDP and it plays ‘an essential role in consolidating democracy in post-conflict 
countries’ (Ginsberg & Penksa 2012: 116). Moreover, cooperation with civil society is necessary in 
order to ensure broad local ownership of reforms, in which the EU tries to assist via CSDP, and 
more effective early warning and conflict prevention (Fihl 2015). Finally, the involvement of civil 
society in CSDP has a democratising potential: civil society organisations may improve the output 
legitimacy of EU decisions and enhance the transparency of the policy process (Dembinski & 
Joachim 2014). 
 
The findings of the few studies that have examined the participation of NSA in CSDP are somewhat 
contradictory. Some scholars show that non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are not missing 
actors in the EU security and defence policy. Lobbying the Council, national capitals and 
supranational institutions, they achieve some degree of success in reaching their policy goals 
(Joachim & Dembinski 2011; Dembinski & Joachim 2014). Other scholars demonstrate that NSA 
remain marginal in CSDP (Mérand et al. 2011). Yet others maintain that despite the lack of formal 
institutional arrangements enabling access to CSDP structures, NSA and EU officials interact 
informally (Gourlay 2006, Irrera 2013). Interactions with NSA are more intense in the field where 
EU crisis management missions are deployed than in Brussels (Ginsberg and Penksa 2012: 95). 
Even in the field, however, such engagement seems unstructured and dependent on individual 
officers’ personal interests (Palm 2010). 
 
These limited insights offer little knowledge on how the EU engagement with NSA varies across 
different stages of the policy cycle, what forms it takes and what factors it depends on. This article 
aims to fill this gap by asking: When, how and why do NSA gain access to CSDP structures? First, 
this study inquires into the practices of participation of non-state actors in CSDP, both formal and 
informal, across various stages of the policy cycle. Second, it attempts to understand the factors that 
facilitate engagement of CSDP officials with NSA. For example, what makes CSDP more open to 
NSA during implementation in the field and less accessible during policymaking in Brussels? To 
answer these questions, the article focuses on two civilian missions in the EU neighbourhood: the 
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EU Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories and the EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia.  
 
Drawing on over 60 interviews with policymakers, NSA representatives and experts conducted in 
the EU, Georgia and Palestine in 2014 and early 2015, this article argues that in the absence of 
effective formal rules guiding the EU’s interaction with NSA in CSDP, informal channels of 
interaction have become more important. However, the patterns of interaction are uneven. NSA 
remain largely excluded from engagement in the agenda-setting, planning and decision-making 
phase, but their inputs are more welcome during the implementation of the mission’s mandate.  
Driven by functional needs in terms of resources and services, EU policymakers provide NSA with 
informal access. In particular, CSDP missions seek cooperation with NSA in order to implement 
core elements of their mandates more effectively. Lobbying EU crisis management structures on the 
issues in which they are interested, NSA expand the space for their participation in EU foreign and 
security policy. They invest in building ‘good relations’ based on trust and developing the 
organisations’ reputation and credibility as providers of useful information and other services to EU 
diplomats and bureaucrats.  However, rationalist-based resource exchange theories explain only part 
of the story. Institutional and individual cultures of transparency and interaction with outside actors, 
including civil society, seem to mediate the extent to which CSDP structures open up to NSA. The 
study contributes to the literature on informal governance in EU foreign policymaking as well as to 
studies on NSA participation in international organisations. It also adds to the nascent academic and 
policy debate on non-state actor participation in CSDP. 
 
This article consists of five parts. First, it outlines a theoretical framework explaining the 
participation of NSA in international organisations and the factors that facilitate or restrain it. Then, 
after briefly presenting two cases of EU civilian crisis management in Georgia and Palestine, it 
analyses the EU’s engagement with NSA in CSDP across different stages of the policy cycle and 
the factors that explain the access of NSA to CSDP structures. In the conclusion, the article 
summarises the main findings and implications for future research. 
 
Non-state actors’ access to international organisations 
The question of non-state actor participation in CSDP is approached in this article from the 
perspective of three strands of literature: informal governance in the EU; lobbying in EU foreign 
policy; and the participation of NSA in international organisations. The literature on informal 
governance views the EU as a polity in which formal rules are applied along with informal rules to 
allow European integration to advance (Christiansen & Piattoni 2003; Christiansen & Neuhold 
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2013; Kleine 2013). Governance in the EU is often conceptualised as a system of policy networks 
in which public and private actors interact with each other. What makes it informal is that the 
interactions between individual and collective, public and private actors in these networks are based 
on non-codified (unwritten) rules and not publicly sanctioned (Christiansen and Piattoni 2003: 7).  
 
The informal governance framework explains the interaction between policymakers and NSA (civil 
society and corporate interest groups) as an instrumental relationship based on the logic of supply, 
demand and mediation (Justaert & Keukeleire 2012: 439). Advocacy groups are interested in 
shaping policy outcomes, whereas policymakers seek crucial information and mediate between the 
different interests affected by the policy. Consulting civil society may help policymakers to better 
adapt policies to the realities on the ground and ensure their smooth implementation. In the EU 
foreign policy context, informal consultations between policymakers and NSA facilitate the 
exchange of information and pooling of expertise (ibidem: 446). This helps in devising more 
effective foreign policy and increasing the EU’s impact abroad. Moreover, NSA such as NGOs may 
be involved in the implementation of EU foreign policies as, for example, in the area of EU conflict 
resolution (see Marchetti & Tocci 2011). 
 
In the communitarised policy areas, consultations with NSA are formalised through EU law (though 
informal interactions take place in parallel). Complying with a legal obligation deriving from the 
Treaty on the European Union to consult with interested parties, the Commission deploys various 
tools for formalised consultations during the policy formulation and legislation-making process. 
Since 2011, organised civil society has also been able to participate in legislation-making by 
submitting proposals to the Commission in the sphere of its competences via the European Citizens 
Initiative. The Commission and European Parliament jointly run the EU’s Transparency Register 
for interest representatives, which are encouraged to register in exchange for greater inclusion in 
consultation schemes and an access pass to the Parliament. 
 
Although few formal mechanisms for consultations with NSA on foreign policy issues exist, 
interactions between policymakers and interest groups take place informally. The studies on 
lobbying in EU foreign policy demonstrate that NSA target EU institutions with regard to issues in 
which they are interested (Voltolini 2016), including in CSDP (Joachim & Dembinski 2011). 
Joachim and Dembinski (2011) illustrate how NGOs, through creating a European-wide coalition 
and using multiple access points, successfully lobbied for the adoption of a legally binding 
framework for arms export control at the EU level. While interactions with civil society are not 
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formally institutionalised, the intergovernmental institutions provide NSA with informal access. 
The literature on non-state actors’ participation in global governance offers insights into why 
intergovernmental organisations open up to NSA (Steffek et al. 2008, Joachim and Locher 2009, 
Jönsson and Tallberg 2010, Irrera 2013, Tallberg et al. 2014).  
 
This literature addresses the issue from various theoretical perspectives. Some scholars argue on 
sociological institutionalist and constructivist grounds that access is increasingly provided to NSA 
due to the spread of participatory governance norms (Saurugger 2010). In other words, policy-
makers have either been socialised into believing in the appropriateness of non-state actors’ 
participation or have strategically adapted the institutional arrangements to boost organisational 
legitimacy. Drawing on rationalist assumptions, other scholars maintain that functional logic and 
resource exchange models better explain why access is provided (Mayer 2008, Steffek 2010, 
Tallberg et al. 2014). In particular, demand for resources and services of NSA and domestic 
democratic standards in the member states of international organisations account for the expansion 
of access to NSA (Tallberg et al. 2014). In contrast, the sovereignty costs associated with the 
involvement of NSA in the policy process constrain the access and contribute to its variation across 
issue areas and policy functions (ibidem). Areas such as human rights, development and the 
environment are more open to NSA, whereas security is more closed (Steffek et al. 2008; Steffek 
2010; Tallberg et al. 2014). NSA are also more welcome during the implementation, evaluation and 
policy formulation stages of the policy process in which the bureaucratic bodies of international 
organisations are involved; and they are shielded from access during intergovernmental decision-
making (Tallberg et al. 2014).  
  
The above-mentioned studies, however, examined the formal rules of participation of NSA and, 
thus, may offer only a limited insight into informal access. While they argue that security policy is 
largely closed to formal participation, NSA may engage informally. The question arises, to what 
extent are the factors explaining informal access different from those accounting for formal 
conditions. It can be assumed that constructivist-driven explanations emphasising the spread of 
participatory governance norms are likely to play a minor role since informal access is less visible 
and, thus, can hardly boost organisational legitimacy.  Functional efficiency can still be enhanced 
by NSA through informal access, and therefore, rationalist explanations are likely to play a major 
role in explaining informal access. If so, what functional needs of CSDP structures do NSA meet 
and how do they differ in Brussels and in the field? How do they differ within CSDP missions with 
different mandates and how does the local context come into play? 
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This article focuses on the EU’s engagement with non-state actors in two civilian CSDP missions 
deployed in two different conflict contexts. The selection of civilian missions is due to the fact that 
they constitute two thirds of CSDP operations abroad. The missions that have been on the ground 
for a longer time period have been selected in order to trace the evolution of the EU’s engagement 
with NSA. Furthermore, CSDP missions in the EU proximity and deployed in the low intensity 
conflict contexts have been considered due to the logistical and security limitations of the field 
research. Given the interest of NSA in the EU policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
(Voltolini 2016), EUPOL COPPS seems to be the ‘most likely’ case for the EU’s engagement with 
NSA in CSDP. To add an additional exploratory case, EUMM has been selected as a civilian CSDP 
mission in the Eastern neighbourhood that has been on the ground for an approximately similar 
period of time, but with a different mandate. Although the mandates of these missions differ, both 
are non-executive (as in the case of most civilian missions).  
 
EU civilian crisis management in Georgia and Palestine 
The EU Police Mission for the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL COPPS) and the EU Monitoring 
Mission (EUMM) are among the oldest ongoing civilian missions. Deployed in two different 
conflict contexts, the missions differ in terms of their key functions and tasks and their size, while 
they are a part of a broader EU response to the crises in the neighbourhood (since Table 1).  
 
EUMM was deployed to monitor the implementation of the EU-mediated six-point ceasefire 
agreement that ended the Russia-Georgia war over Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which had broken 
away from Tbilisi’s control in the early 1990s. Deploying the mission in September 2008, just a few 
weeks after the war, the EU aimed to contribute to long-term stability throughout Georgia and the 
surrounding areas and short-term stabilisation reducing the risk of a resumption of hostilities. The 
EUMM mandate includes four key tasks: (1) stabilisation - the mission monitors, analyses and 
reports on the situation pertaining to the stabilisation process, centred on full compliance with the 
six-point agreement, including troop withdrawals, and on freedom of movement and actions by 
spoilers, as well as on violations of human rights and international humanitarian law; (2) 
normalisation - the mission monitors, analyses and reports on the situation pertaining to the 
normalisation process of civil governance, focusing on rule of law, effective law enforcement 
structures and adequate public order; (3) confidence-building - it contributes to the reduction of 
tensions through liaison, the facilitation of contacts between parties and other confidence building 
measures; and (4) informing European policy (Council 2008a). At its peak, EUMM had over 400 
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staff, including 274 international staff. The mission has headquarters in Tbilisi and three field 
offices in Gori, Mtskheta and Zugdidi, which are responsible for monitoring the Administrative 
Border Line (ABL) separating the two breakaway regions from Tbilisi-controlled territories. 
 
Despite its Georgia-wide mandate, EUMM has never obtained access to South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia. Although the hostilities ended, the prospects for peaceful conflict resolution have 
arguably not improved. Russia has never fully implemented the six-point agreement. After 
recognising the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, it has established a long-term military 
presence, launched the process of ‘borderisation’ (erecting fences and barbed wire and placing 
additional border guards on the ABL) and signed far-reaching integration treaties with the de facto 
authorities. However, the mission is widely seen as a success for its quick deployment and 
contribution to easing tensions and preventing outbreaks of violence. For Georgia’s government, 
EUMM is important as an international presence on the ground, especially since the UN and OSCE 
missions had to withdraw due to Russia’s veto (Interview (A), 2014). Russia also appreciates 
EUMM, though non-publicly, as it reinforces the status quo (Boonstra & Melvin 2011: 15). 
 
EUPOL COPPS has been deployed to enhance the EU’s contribution to state-building in Palestine 
within the logic of two state solution envisaging the creation of the Palestinian state along with the 
state of Israel, which was endorsed by the EU and the international community (see Bouris 2014: 
Chapter 3). In 2005, the EU sent two CSDP missions to Palestine – EUPOL COPPS and EUBAM 
Rafah – with the aim of enhancing its visibility in the international conflict resolution and 
mitigating against the image of ‘the payer, not the player’.i The EUPOL COPPS mandate initially 
consisted of three dimensions: (1) assisting the Palestinian Civilian Police (PCP) in the 
implementation of the PCP development programme by advising and closely mentoring PCP, and 
specifically senior officials at District, Headquarters and Ministerial level; (2) coordinating and 
facilitating EU and Member State assistance, and where requested, international assistance to PCP; 
and (3) advising on police-related Criminal Justice elements (Council 2005). In 2008, the mission’s 
mandate was expanded to the rule of law area (Council 2008b), which emphasised the link between 
policing and justice. Within the rule of law area, EUPOL COPPS provides advice to the Ministry of 
Justice, the Courts, the Prosecution, the Correction and Rehabilitation Centres Department as well 
as the Bar Association of lawyers and the Independent Commission on Human Rights (EEAS 
2015). Headquartered in Ramallah, the mission has expanded and in 2015 it comprised 71 
international staff and 41 local staff.  
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EUPOL COPPS has been recognised by the EU and member states, the Israeli government and the 
PA as a success (Bouris 2014: 112-113). However, the EU has been criticised by scholars and civil 
society groups for focusing on technical training and infrastructure building, while missing the link 
with the non-reformed political institutions that underpin the security sector in Palestine and a 
broader political strategy of conflict resolution and support towards building a viable Palestinian 
state (Bouris and Reigeluth 2012, Kristoff 2012, Bouris 2014). The danger of an overly technical 
approach to police reform is aggravated by the fact that Palestinian society largely distrusts security 
agencies, including the police, and sees security sector reform (SSR) as an externally-owned 
process serving the occupier’s interests, rather than those of Palestinian society (Interview (Q), 
2014; Interview (R), 2014; Friedrich & Luethold 2008; Kristoff 2012). Meanwhile, the two-state 
solution to which the EU mission seeks to contribute is seen as being increasingly under strain 
(ECFR 2013). 
 
Table 1. Overview of the two missions in focus  
 EUMM  
(operational since 2008) 
EUPOL COPPS 
(operational since 2006) 
Mandate Ceasefire monitoring Police & Rule of Law 
Main tasks - stabilisation (compliance with the 
ceasefire)  
- normalisation of civil governance 
- confidence-building 
- informing the EU 
- advising & mentoring on the police reform 
and criminal justice  
- coordinating  and facilitating EU and 
member states’ aid 
Location Tbilisi (HQ), field offices in Gori, Mtskheta 
& Zugdidi  
Ramallah (HQ) 
Staff (as of 2015) 204 international  71 international 
Heads of Mission  Carrier diplomats, with an exception of a 
military official (2011-2013) 
Police 
Other EU conflict 
resolution and crisis 
management tools 
deployed 
EU Special Representative, humanitarian 
and development assistance, participation in 
the multilateral peace talks 
EUBAM Rafah (inactive since 2007), EU 
Special Representative, humanitarian and 
development assistance, participation in the 
multilateral peace talks 
 
When and how non-state actors access CSDP: formal and informal practices of participation 
It is argued in this section that though formal rules guiding the engagement of CSDP structures with 
NSA exist, they are not systematically put into practice. Moreover, they are subdued due to a more 
powerful rule of secrecy and confidentiality in the EU security policy. Against such a background, 
the power of informality governs interactions between CSDP structures and NSA. Due to informal 
access, NSA gain room for participation in the policy process, though mainly when missions are 
already deployed in the field. However, informality also implies that their involvement is non-
systematic and fragile, as it depends on the individual entrepreneurship of NSA representatives and 
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policymakers that share an interest in the mutual exchange of information and cooperation. 
Ineffective formal rules 
The formal rules guiding the interaction of CSDP structures with civil society are outlined in the 
‘Recommendations for Enhancing Co-operation with Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) 
and Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) in the Framework of EU Civilian Crisis Management and 
Conflict Prevention’ adopted by the Council’s Committee on Civilian Aspects of Crisis 
Management (CIVCOM) in November 2006. The document was a result of the political 
entrepreneurship of the Finnish Presidency in the EU, which was interested in the development of 
the civilian CSDP and civil society engagement. Finland’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs supported, 
both politically and financially, the efforts of two Finnish NGOs, which were later joined by the 
Brussels-based European Peacebuilding Liaison Office (EPLO) to develop and promote specific 
recommendations for enhanced EU cooperation with civil society (Gourlay 2006). Drafted on the 
basis of these recommendations, the CIVCOM document went through ‘tough’ negotiations in the 
Council, as ‘some member states, notably from the South, regarded civil society as not being a 
priority’ (Interview (B), 2014). 
 
The three-page document defines the operational efficiency of EU crisis management as the goal of 
cooperation with NGOs and CSOs and proposes CSDP structures to engage them via informal 
exchanges at the Political and Security Committee (PSC) and CIVCOM in the Council; during fact-
finding and pre-planning missions; in the mission evaluation and lessons learnt process; via the 
establishment of NGO/CSO liaison officers in the missions and the Council Secretariat, and through 
defining modalities for routine information exchange with civil society in the field (CIVCOM 
2006). However, it appears from the interviews that the CIVCOM recommendations are not applied 
in a systematic way. Their implementation seems to depend on an EU official interpreting and 
applying them. For example, the EUMM personnel working with civil society say that the 
guidelines are vague, and their superiors may not be open to information exchanges with civil 
society.  
 
Apart from the general character of the CIVCOM recommendations, the rule of confidentiality in 
CSDP seems to be in conflict with a greater openness to civil society. An EEAS official gave a 
visual example:  
CSDP departments sit in the Cortenbergh building. This is an extra secure building with 
additional security checks. This gives you an idea of the inaccessibility. When we were there, 
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we would accept PhD students. But there is a lot more of a culture of secrecy, as there are more 
sensitive issues, more information that may not be disclosed (Interview (C), 2014). 
 
Many of the NGOs interviewed also complained about the lack of transparency and access as major 
obstacles to advocacy on CSDP related issues. A representative of a Brussels-based think-tank, 
which ran a CSDP mapping online portal, stated that EEAS crisis management departments were 
unwilling to give them basic factual data on CSDP missions, perceiving it as secret and 
confidential. Instead, they received the requested information from the missions and several 
member states’ representations in Brussels, mainly from Scandinavian states and Germany 
(Interview (D), 2014). 
 
At the implementation level, the mission’s operation plan (OPLAN) approved by the Council may 
mention the need to liaise with CSOs, whereas the missions regulate the methods of engagement 
with non-state actors in the Mission Implementation Plan (MIP) and other internal documents. 
MIPs usually have some provisions concerning engagement with civil society and may go as far as 
mentioning specific NGOs working on the issues relevant to the mission’s mandate. In the case of 
EUMM, a more detailed internal concept paper has outlined a rationale for the mission’s 
engagement with civil society. 
Informal practices 
Informal engagement with NSA prevails in CSDP: it does not take place within formally run 
consultations and remains unpublicised beyond the small circle of those invited to participate. For 
example, in Brussels, PSC and CIVCOM have regular meetings with NGOs, which are often held 
as working breakfasts. Policymakers also seek to attend meetings organised by NGOs, which are 
often organised by EPLO or other key international NGOs working on the relevant conflicts. In the 
field, information exchange often takes place ‘over a cup of tea or coffee’ or on the margins of 
official events.  
 
Despite the regular interactions, engagement with NSA during the earlier stages of the policy cycle 
is very limited. The interviews with EEAS and Council representatives involved in CSDP reveal 
that Brussels-based actors exclude NSA during agenda-setting, planning and decision-making, but 
may consult them during the strategic review of missions. In contrast, the CSDP missions reach out 
to NSA more intensively at the implementation stage. 
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As an EPLO representative explained, the first time the EEAS structures reached out to EPLO 
during the planning process was in the case of the EU Advisory Mission (EUAM) to Ukraine, 
deployed in July 2014 (Interview (E), 2014). However, the meeting was mostly dedicated to 
convincing the EU officials of the value of cooperating with civil society on the ground by bringing 
examples of civil society involvement in SSR in Ukraine and other transition and conflict contexts. 
Without having any access to the planning documents or even discussions, the NGOs found it 
difficult to make any substantial contribution to the EU debate. Whereas fact-finding missions are 
deployed on the ground before a CSDP mission is planned, EU officials in the fact-finding missions 
are often short of time to meet with NGOs and civil society, as their agenda is dominated by 
government and international actors (Interview (F), 2014). 
 
There seems to be more engagement with NSA during the evaluation of a mission’s impact, or a 
strategic review, but this is not systematic either. As a CIVCOM member stated:  
[The strategic planners at the EEAS] do try to reach beyond the strict circle, but it is still limited. They 
could be coming to the country to do the review there, for a week or so, but there are limits on amounts of 
contacts. They are mainly governmental and international actors, and there is not much time for outside 
actors (Interview (F), 2014).  
 
An EPLO representative confirmed that NSA involvement in strategic reviews has gradually 
become an informal practice:  
Together with OSI we thought that strategic reviews could be an opportunity for us to engage with crisis 
management bodies. We started information meetings with the crisis management structures in which no-
one would know that strategic planners meet civil society. We would go to the Cortenbergh building and 
then leave in secret, so the member states would not know. It started with the EU police mission to the 
Democratic Republic of Congo [deployed in 2005-2007]. Now we have a more established process. We 
also do it through the Civil Society Development Network [financially supported by the European 
Commission]. It allows us to cover our time and also to bring civil society experts from outside Brussels. 
Before it was only people who were based here and there are not many, because we did not have funds to 
bring them (Interview (E), 2014). 
 
The EU policymakers have different perceptions about the added value of involving civil society in 
strategic reviews. An interviewed EEAS official found a meeting with NGOs on the last strategic 
review of EUMM ‘superficial’ (Interview (G), 2014). Apparently, the invited NGOs lacked 
information on the specific issues that the EEAS wanted to discuss. In the case of EUPOL COPPS, 
consultations with local and international NGOs in Palestine in the process of preparation of the 
first strategic review were instrumental in expanding the mission’s mandate to criminal justice in 
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May 2008 (Interview (B), 2014). 
 
At the implementation level, interactions between CSDP staff and NSA are more intense. However, 
there is significant variation in the size and scope of the two missions. Each mission has its own 
ways of reaching out to civil society and NGOs. The EUMM headquarters at Tbilisi and the field 
offices have a number of institutionalised practices of communication with civil society. The office 
in Zugdidi holds information sharing meetings with local civil society every four weeks (Interview 
(T), 2015). The Gori field office runs monthly briefings for local NGOs after the meetings of the 
Incident Prevention and Reaction Mechanism (IPRM), a diplomatic forum to address the 
consequences of the 2008 conflict, co-chaired by the OSCE, the EU and the UN, in which the 
Georgia and South Ossetian de facto authorities, as well as Russia and the US participate (Interview 
(U), 2015). Local CSOs use the 24-hour telephone hotline system attached to the IPRM to quickly 
report on specific incidents. At the time when the interviews were conducted, the Mtskheta office 
was planning to establish regular consultations with local civil society (Interview (V), 2015). Each 
year EUMM runs a 16-day activism campaign against gender based violence during which its 
gender advisers and monitors meet police officers and also NGO and local community 
representatives across the country. The mission’s Press and Public Information Unit set up the 
EUMM Prize for Peace Journalism as a means ‘to reconnect with media’ and to reach out to the 
South Ossetian, Abkhazian and ethnic Georgian journalists working on the conflict (Interview (H), 
2015). 
 
Besides these more formalised practices of consultation and engagement, a number of staff in the 
EUMM’s headquarters and field offices, such as political advisers, human rights advisers, gender 
advisers, analytical capability analysts, press and public information officers, human security teams 
and hotline coordinators have regular (daily, weekly or monthly) contact with CSOs to enable the 
exchange of information and views. Both in Tbilisi and in the field offices, EUMM staff reach out 
to civil society actors informally at numerous events organised by NGOs and international 
organisations. EU officials are also invited to be observers at confidence-building events organised 
by NGOs, which bring together civil society representatives and, at times, officials representing the 
conflict parties.  
 
There are no formal mechanisms of consultation with civil society in EUPOL COPPS. Informal 
interactions with civil society are concentrated in the Rule of Law section, mainly at the level of 
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human rights and gender advisers, who keep regular (on a weekly basis) contact with CSOs as a 
partner to mainstream gender and human rights within the official counterparts. Cooperation with 
civil society is largely on an ad hoc basis and is driven by individuals rather than the institution (see 
also Palm 2010: 20-21). For example, women’s organisations are occasionally involved in training 
provided by the mission for Palestinian police or they are asked for feedback on police 
accountability and oversight (Sundin and Olsson 2014). 
 
In addition, four Palestinian NGOs were implementing partners in the UN Development 
Programme-EUPOL COPPS Joint Programme ‘Strengthening Internal Police Accountability, 
National Anti-Corruption and Civilian Oversight’ co-funded by the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden 
and Belgium. Through this programme EUPOL COPPS sought to encourage internal and external 
accountability of the PCP, in part as a reaction to the criticism of Palestinian and international 
NGOs regarding human rights violations by security agencies and corruption in the PA. External 
accountability is seen as important in the absence of parliamentary oversight since the mandate of 
the Palestinian Legislative Council has expired. However, the Palestine police are reluctant to be 
placed under external supervision and EUPOL COPPS has helped to set up mechanisms of internal 
accountability, on the one hand, and to promote police openness to the public by funding the work 
of selected NGOs on civilian-police cooperation, the culture of complaints and monitoring, on the 
other (Interview (I), 2014). The EUPOL COPPS interactions with civil society have mainly 
occurred on the margins of events aimed at civil society interactions with PCP and the Anti-
Corruption Commission envisaged by the Joint Programme. 
 
To sum up, formal rules on the EU’s engagement with civil society in the civilian CSDP do exist. 
However, their general character leaves a great deal of room for interpretation by EU officials. 
Moreover, sharing information with outside actors is seen to be in conflict with the prevailing 
prerogative of non-disclosure or carefully filtering of information about CSDP missions. Against 
such a background, informal channels of interaction between EU officials and NSA are of 
increasing importance to complement or substitute for the ineffective formal rules (see Helmke & 
Levitsky 2004). Although an exchange of information with NSA takes place in Brussels, CSDP 
structures exclude them from the early stages of the policy process, including the planning of 
missions. Brussels-based actors may also consult NSA in the process of evaluating a mission’s 
impact. Interactions are more intense during the implementation phase, though there are notable 
differences in the level of cooperation with NSA in the two missions that are the focus of this study.  
EUMM has developed consultations and regular contact with NSA across its various levels and 
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units, while EUPOL COPPS engagement remains modest.  
 
Why do NSA gain access?: Resource exchange, bureaucratic culture and lobbying as ‘the 
push factor’ 
As will be argued in this section the rationalist accounts presented in the literature on non-state 
actor participation in international organisations such as resource exchange theories explain the 
EU’s engagement with NSA to a greater extent. However, constructivist-based explanations should 
not be discarded either. It appears from the interviews that organisational and individual cultures 
provide a complementary vision of why access is facilitated or restrained. Finally, the supply side, 
or ‘push factor’ – the intensity of non-state actors’ advocacy on CSDP issues – should also be taken 
into account in the story of the EU’s engagement with NSA (see also Steffek 2013). 
Engagement as a resource exchange 
Resource exchange theories (Bouwen 2002, Steffek 2013) offer a powerful explanation as to why 
EU officials provide informal access to NSA. Exchange of information, analysis and expertise are 
the main goods that EU policymakers seek from civil society. 
 
The interviewed EUMM officials emphasised that information that comes from NSA ‘adds to what 
comes from the official side’ and ‘provides for an alternative vision to formulate the mission’s 
reports’. According to them, cooperation with civil society ‘contributes to the mission’s analytical 
capacity’ and ‘helps to resolve problems within the EUMM mandate’ (Interview (H), 2015). 
Similarly, the EUPOL COPPS officials believe that engagement with NGOs helps the mission to 
put its ‘work in the context’ and ‘provides a complementary vision on the performance of 
Palestinian police’ in the absence of a monitoring mandate (Interview (I), 2014; Interview (J), 2014; 
Interview (C), 2014). 
 
In the context of the conflicts, when access to some geographical areas is limited for EU officials, 
or a party in the conflict is represented by ‘de facto authorities’ or ‘terrorist groups’ with which the 
EU does not have a formal relationship, information brought by NSA is often the only source from 
which to learn about local views and developments. This is the case for Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia, to which EUMM does not have access and for Gaza, where EUPOL COPPS has not been 
able to operate since the split within the Palestine Authority in 2007. 
 
Many of the interviewed Brussels-based officials see the value of information and expertise brought 
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by NSA at the stages of planning a mission (the early warning function and knowledge of local 
conditions and the conflict context), its implementation (providing ‘the reality check’, delivering 
information on whether and how political decisions by the host authorities are implemented, and 
ensuring democratic accountability and oversight of security sector) and during the evaluation of 
the mission’s impact (Interview (B), 2014; Interview (C), 2014; Interview (F), 2014; Interview (G), 
2014; Interview (M), 2014; Interview (P), 2014). Outside perspectives are also regarded as 
important given the under-resourced civilian CSDP capabilities in Brussels and the lack of 
necessary expertise in the member states (Interview (M), 2014; Interview (F), 2014). Moreover, 
NSA often possess longer institutional memories of the conflicts than EU crisis management 
institutions. As a policymaker working on the South Caucasus conflicts at the EEAS put it: ‘People 
in NGOs were involved in the conflict for decades, while people in the international organisations 
are in and out’ (Interview (K), 2014).  
 
The EU officials also added that cooperation with civil society is needed to ‘have our intentions 
understood’ and gain a societal understanding and support for the mission’s work. In the field, it 
translates, for example, into cooperation with a local NGO that runs a radio station, which reaches 
out to the population in Abkhazia to disperse myths about the EUMM mandate and its activities. 
EUMM officials also pass information based on their monitoring to CSOs in order to reach out to 
the local population and authorities, especially in the breakaway regions to which the mission does 
not have access.  
 
The sovereignty costs associated with the involvement of outsiders in the policy process seem to 
explain the limits of engagement between civil society and CSDP structures as a resource exchange. 
In line with the literature on the participation of NSA in international organisations (Tallberg et al. 
2014), most CSDP engagement with NSA takes place during the implementation of a mission’s 
mandate in the field rather than during intergovernmental policymaking in Brussels. 
Driven by the mission’s mandate 
Comparing the engagement with NSA in the two missions reveals that the mandate that defines the 
main aims and functions of a CSDP mission is an important factor explaining its openness to the 
outside world and the quantity and quality of contacts with civil society on the ground.  EUMM is 
tasked with monitoring and information gathering, including from NSA. Moreover, it contributes to 
the normalisation of the situation and the lives of the conflict-affected population, and thus an 
important element of the mission’s mandate is of a humanitarian nature. While the mission does not 
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provide humanitarian aid, it cooperates with local civil society organisations with regard to the 
referral and follow-up of the results of monitoring (for example, individual cases of displaced or 
conflict-affected people who need help). Having a lot of staff on the ground and interacting with 
local communities and stakeholders, including CSOs, EUMM is an example of a CSDP mission 
that is open to NSA. In contrast, EUPOL COPPS is an advisory and mentoring mission that 
primarily aims to assist the Palestinian authorities with reform of the police and criminal justice. 
Most of its staff are policemen working with their counterparts in the Palestinian police or 
prosecutors working with Palestinian prosecutors. Only the advisers dealing with mainstreaming 
human rights and gender have regular contact with civil society. 
 
As a political advisor at EUMM explained, ‘civil society engagement is to support the EUMM 
activities in the implementation of the mandate’ (Interview (L), 2015). The mission’s staff 
mentioned engagement with civil society related to all four aspects of the mandate: 1) stabilisation - 
civil society is regarded as helpful in ensuring democratic oversight of security actors in Georgia; 
moreover, from a human security perspective, NGOs also act as security actors as they provide 
essential services such as food and water to the conflict-affected population; 2) normalisation - civil 
society is seen as instrumental in promoting the rule of law and human security, and improving the 
situation of the displaced and conflict-affected population; 3) confidence-building: confidence 
building activities promoted by civil society and involving the conflict-affected populations on both 
sides of the ABL are seen as important and given the lack of the mission’s access to South Ossetia 
and Abkhazia, civil society actors help the mission to better understand the situation in the 
breakaway regions; and 4) information gathering and verification - NSA are viewed as another 
source of information. The latter aspect of the mission is probably the most prominent in the 
EUMM’s contacts with NSA. Moreover, engagement with civil society is seen as contributing to 
enhancing EUMM’s transparency and outreach. Finally, a potential role for civil society is 
contemplated in the context of EUMM’s exit strategy. NGOs are seen as taking some of the EUMM 
tasks related to the monitoring of the human security situation in the communities across the ABL, 
inspired by an example of community-led monitoring systems established by the UK-based NGO 
Saferworld and its local partners (Interview (G), 2014). 
 
In the case of EUPOL COPPS, the engagement with NSA is more limited. The mission’s primary 
task is to assist the Palestinian Authority bodies. The mission representatives interviewed stated that 
communication with local NGOs provides a complementary vision of the police and justice sector 
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in the absence of a monitoring mandate. However, the lack of such a mandate is also a reason why, 
compared to EUMM, EUPOL COPPS does not need to exchange information with NSA regularly. 
The EUPOL COPPS’ engagement with civil society is mainly driven by the need to have civil 
society organisations monitoring and cooperating with security agencies in order to ‘legitimise 
partner institutions’ in the absence of a legitimate parliament. 
From secrecy to openness and back: individual and institutional cultures 
In line with the constructivist explanation, the spread of participatory governance norms would lead 
to the expansion of non-state actor access to CSDP over time. This motivation was hardly 
mentioned by the interviewed policymakers. Moreover, the formal rules of access have not evolved 
since their adoption in 2006. Although informal practices have developed, their expansion is not 
linear. The research reveals that individual and institutional cultures (police/military vs. civilian; 
member states’ national bureaucracies; Commission vs. Council) seem to mediate the extent to 
which informal access to NSA is provided. 
 
At the level of implementation, the mandate of the mission determines the kind of personnel that are 
recruited. While EUMM consists of people with military, police and civilian backgrounds, 
including people who used to work for or with civil society organisations, the EUPOL COPPS staff 
mainly come from police, prosecution and judiciary backgrounds. This also influences the 
organisational culture of the mission. An EUPOL COPPS official shared his insight:  
EUPOL COPPS is a very inward looking mission. It is organisationally looking towards the police; there 
is a police culture, a culture of not sharing information. We keep together even if we come from different 
countries. If you share too much information, you risk not having authority. They – the police – need 
authority (Interview (I), 2014).  
 
In this regard, organisational culture appears to be an important factor explaining the openness of 
the CSDP structures to the outside world. The interviewee spoke of the police culture as a type of 
occupational culture that includes values, beliefs and norms shared by the representatives of the 
police profession that has certain impacts on their behaviour and thinking. Authority, secrecy, 
solidarity and suspicion or a lack of trust in outside actors are usually associated with police 
occupational culture and seem to transcend national borders (Crank 2015; O’Neill et al. 2007). It 
may be the case that occupational culture is reconstructed and embedded at the level of a new 
organisation constituted by police officers from different European countries. The impact of 
occupational cultures on the organisational cultures of the EU bodies has already been discussed in 
the literature. In her study on the role of knowledge-based networks in European security 
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integration, Cross (2011) concludes that the military occupational culture has contributed to 
smoother decision-making in the EU Military Committee. 
 
Scholars have previously written about the different organisational cultures of the EEAS: whereas 
the geographical departments that came from the Commission seem more open to NSA and have 
inherited a culture of consultation with civil society, the crisis management departments that came 
from the Council Secretariat have a different culture characterised by secret intergovernmental 
negotiation (Carta 2012: 152). This finding was corroborated by the interviewees, both NSA and 
policymakers. The interviewed NGOs also underlined that different organisational cultures exist at 
the level of the member states’ bureaucracies and diplomacies with which they deal. They 
mentioned Nordic countries, such as Sweden and Finland, as most open to civil society, whereas the 
statist tradition seems to dominate in France and Eastern EU member states.  
 
Organisational cultures may also be ‘broken’ by individuals who are more open to civil society due 
to their personal backgrounds and beliefs. The personal interest and engagement of CSDP officials 
enables NSA to circumvent the lack of formal access and the prevalent secrecy. As the EPLO 
representative explained, their allies in different crisis management bodies provide them with access 
by ‘offering a service of having discussions with civil society’ (Interview (E), 2014).  
 
However, the opposite holds as well: individuals also play an important role in keeping CSDP 
structures shielded from NSA. A EUMM representative narrated a vivid example of such a clash: 
When I came to the mission, I dared to say to the staff in one of the field offices to share filtered 
information with NGOs, to share information about water issues and other issues relevant for 
communities. I was slapped in the face in front of everybody by the field office chief. It really depends on 
the personality of the Head of Mission. In Brussels, I was told to engage with civil society and the media, 
but it is not what is going on here (Interview (H), 2015). 
 
The leadership of the mission has freedom to manoeuvre in terms of the interpretation of the 
mission’s mandate and, thus, can define the modalities of sharing information, reaching out to the 
media and NSA. In the case of EUMM, both EU staff and civil society advocates agreed that 
NGOs’ ability to influence the mission’s work has varied over time depending on the mission chief 
in place. The period when the mission was led by an army general was characterised by a lack of 
access of NGOs, who were seen as ‘Russian spies’ in the words of one interviewee (Interview (S), 
2014). With the arrival of a civilian chief, the mission also became more open to civil society, 
mechanisms of consultations and outreach to civil society were established, and the concept paper 
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on how to engage with civil society was drafted by the mission.  
 
It is noteworthy that many staff who deal with civil society in the missions and in the EEAS 
interviewed for this study come from the northern EU member states, especially the Nordic 
countries. A number of NGOs, especially in Brussels, also mentioned that officials ‘coming from 
the Nordic states‘ tend to be more open to civil society. Moreover, ‘some member states also put 
pressure on the crisis management bodies to be more open to us’, as an advocacy group 
representative revealed (Interview (E), 2014). This tendency deserves further investigation. It may 
well be the case that some member states send more civilian personnel or personnel with non-
governmental experience to CSDP missions. In general, people who are responsible for liaising 
with civil society in the missions tend to have prior experience of dealing with civil society (either 
in a previous position or through having worked for an NGO). 
‘The push factor’: intensity of NSA lobbying 
Building informal access is a two-way street: NSA that advocate on conflict resolution and crisis 
management issues push to expand the space for civil society involvement. There is a small circle 
of NSA involvement in advocacy on the civilian CSDP in Brussels; most of them are think-tanks 
and NGOs.ii The NSA most frequently mentioned by the Brussels-based interviewees is the EPLO, 
the mentioned above EU-level platform of European NGOs mentioned above, NGO networks, and 
think-tanks working on peace-building and conflict prevention. The EU supports EPLO by funding 
the Civil Society Dialogue Network, a mechanism for dialogue between EU policymakers and civil 
society on peace and conflict related issues. Many EPLO members were also mentioned as NSA 
with whom they had engaged by the interviewed EU officials working on the conflicts in Georgia or 
Israel-Palestine.  
 
EPLO takes credit for achieving some success in opening up of crisis management bodies through 
building allies with policymakers at different institutions and the units across them (Interview (E), 
2014. This view was also confirmed by the interviewed Brussels-based policymakers who named 
EPLO and their members as the first contact point and ‘a one-stop shop’ for reaching out to civil 
society. As a diplomat in the Council described: 
[EPLO] has the best outreach in Brussels. They either come to us and we have working breakfasts, or we 
attend their meetings with their guests. For example, we attended a meeting at which the International 
Crisis Group was talking about Ukraine, or Amnesty was talking about Kosovo … Regular contact with 
them is a normal practice (Interview (M), 2014). 
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In the field, local and international NGOs working on Georgia seem to be more active in reaching 
out to the mission than their counterparts in Palestine. Despite the fact that nearly 300 groups are 
trying to influence EU policy towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Voltolini 2016), only a few of 
them have ever focused on the CSDP missions in Palestine. For the majority of most of the active 
advocates both in Brussels and in Palestine, the missions are ‘a marginal issue’ or ‘a small technical 
element’ (Interview (N), 2014; Interview (O), 2014), whereas their advocacy focus is mainly on the 
EU’s policies towards Israel in the context of conflict resolution and crisis management (see 
ibidem). State-building in Palestine, to which the EU seeks to contribute via the CSDP missions, is 
a secondary issue at best, as the vast majority of advocates see it as a ‘no-go’ under Israel’s 
occupation. Palestinian and some international human rights organisations work on the Palestinian 
police reform, but human rights violations related to Israel’s occupation feature much higher on 
their international advocacy agenda. The mandate of EUPOL COPPS is also seen as too narrow by 
Palestinian NGOs, as the mission works only with PCP, while there are other security agencies in 
Palestine with a record of serious human rights violations and lacking civilian oversight.  
 
In the case of EU policy towards the conflicts in Georgia, there are a limited number of groups that 
are trying to influence EU policy, but their advocacy touches upon the core of the EU policy of 
conflict resolution and crisis management conducted via CFSP/CSDP. In most cases, these are 
European and local NGOs who have been working for years on confidence building, development, 
and humanitarian and other conflict-related issues in Georgia and the breakaway entities, and their 
work is very relevant to what the EU does on the ground. For example, NGO Saferworld assisted 
the mission in developing more effective monitoring techniques that would engage the local 
communities and advocated for the inclusion of local communities in confidence building activities 
mediated by EUMM. Local NGOs work with EUMM to obtain assistance in solving human rights 
issues and improving the human security and welfare of the conflict-affected population and use the 
mission as an ally to exert influence on the Georgian authorities or draw the attention of 
international donors. In general, in the case of Georgia, the NSA are more positive about the role of 
EUMM than those involved in advocacy with regard to the EU’s policy towards the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict.  
Conclusion  
This article has examined the practice of the EU’s engagement with NSA in CSDP by focusing on 
two civilian missions in the neighbourhood. It shows that the interaction between NSA and CSDP 
structures take place both in Brussels and in the field in which the CSDP missions operate. 
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However, the participation of NSA is more welcome during the implementation stage than during 
the policymaking process. However, the formal guidelines for cooperation with NSA adopted by 
the Council remain largely ineffective. They are seen as incomplete and in conflict with the culture 
of secrecy and non-disclosure of information in CSDP. At the same time, the information and 
services that NSA can provide are appreciated by EU policymakers and the mission’s staff. There 
seems to be an increasing understanding of the need to cooperate with civil society in the EU and 
especially in the countries in which CSDP missions operate in order to improve the mission’s 
performance and impact. Under such conditions, informal practices of engagement such as informal 
consultations, briefings and one-to-one meetings have become widespread. 
 
The rational choice based and functionalist accounts explain why policymakers open up: CSDP 
missions need NSA to implement the mandate, while non-state actors’ advocacy helps to broaden 
the space for participation. EU officials cooperate with NSA to satisfy their needs in terms of 
information, expertise or other services provided by NSA, which can improve the effectiveness and 
impact of EU crisis management. Exchanges of information and consultations with NSA are more 
common when missions have already been deployed, whereas NSA are largely excluded from the 
early stages of the policy process, including the planning phase of the mission. Most engagement 
occurs at the stage of implementation. This is explained in the literature by higher sovereignty costs, 
which member states associate with the involvement of outsiders in policymaking. Moreover, 
policymakers in Brussels are also busy communicating and coordinating positions internally, 
whereas the mission’s staff have more opportunities to deal with civil society on the ground. 
 
The constructivist account complements the picture. Although the spread of the participatory 
governance norm does not feature as a factor in explaining why CSDP structures facilitate access to 
NSA, individual and institutional cultures do matter. The prevalent culture of secrecy is unevenly 
spread across CSDP structures. The same mission led by staff with a civilian background is more 
open to NSA, whereas police and military personnel seem less habituated to interacting with civil 
society groups. Moreover, it seems that representatives of certain national public administration 
cultures tend to be more supportive towards opening up to NSA.  
 
This finding has an important implication for the literature on non-state actor participation not only 
in the EU security and defence policy, but also in international organisations in general and in the 
security realm in particular. The previous studies on non-state actor access did not pay sufficient 
attention to the role of organisational and individual cultures, and this factor deserves further 
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investigation. 
 
This study emphasises the need to pay greater attention to informal governance in the areas of 
intergovernmental policymaking in the EU and other international institutions because it has greater 
potential to explain how the policies in these organisations are made and how international 
cooperation advances than just looking at formal structures and institutions.  While most studies on 
non-state actors’ participation in global governance focus on formal access, they risk overlooking 
an important element of the overall picture. This article also encourages students of lobbying in the 
EU to examine the pathways to NSA influence beyond the formal consultation channels.  
 
The power of informality in the EU’s engagement with NSA also has important normative 
implications. Informal access for NSA, especially civil society groups, may favour citizens’ 
participation and public scrutiny of the EU foreign and security policy. Given that CSDP is made by 
Brussels-based officials who have little contact with citizen groups from the member states, national 
channels of representation and participation have weakened (Sjursen 2011). European and Brussels-
based NGOs that enjoy informal access to CSDP can provide a link towards greater transparency 
and public debate regarding where the EU sends state-building or post-conflict stabilisation 
missions, or how effectively it supports human rights and international humanitarian law norms in 
crises. However, the informality of the EU’s engagement with NSA also implies that it remains 
hidden from the public eye. While expertise and information may flow between EU policymakers 
and NSA, there seems to be little interest on both sides in publicising these relations (see also 
Dembinski and Joachim 2014). It is noteworthy that NSA lobbying on CSDP in Brussels rarely 
mention the European Parliament as a target of their advocacy or an ally in opening up CSDP 
structures (which could also be due to the fact that the European Parliament’s function of 
scrutinising CSDP is undeveloped). Similarly, more transparency and information about CSDP 
missions is required in the countries of deployment if the EU aspires to use local civil society and 
interest groups as an ally in promoting democratic change. 
 
Further studies are needed in order to understand the interplay of the different factors accounting for 
the EU’s engagement with NSA in CSDP. For example, studies focusing on a larger number of 
cases, also including the EU missions with an executive mandate (EULEX in Kosovo) and military 
operations, could provide more data to verify the current findings. Research is also welcome on the 
                                                          
i  EUBAM Rafah was launched in November 2005 as a border monitoring mission with the aim of 
providing a third party presence at the Rafah Crossing Point linking Gaza with Egypt, facilitating the 
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opening of the crossing point and building up confidence between the Israeli government and the Palestinian 
Authority. When Hamas took control of Gaza in 2007, the operation of the mission was suspended. See 
Bouris (2014). 
ii  This seemingly contrasts with the military CSDP, which attracts a far greater attention of from non-
state actors, especially associations representing the interests of the defence industry and the defence 
research and technology industry. Their lobbying is seen as one of the factors explaining the growth and 
development of CSDP  (Keukeleire and Delreux 2014: 195), and especially the EU’s focus on its military 
dimension. 
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